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KAZAKHSTAN: HOW A NEW PETROLEUM LAW
CAN FUEL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Andrew B. Derman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Kazakhstan sits in the belly of the former Soviet Union. The country's
oil and gas potential has thrust isolated Kazakhstan onto the economic
stage. Kazakhstan has been aided in this regard by the political and eco-
nomic disruptions occurring within The Russian Federation. The Kazakh-
stan Government is headed by President Nursultan Nazarbayev, a lifelong
member of the old communist hierarchy, who has called for evolutionary
reform and has made foreign investment one of the cornerstones of his
vision. It remains unanswered whether Kazakhstan can capture the
moment and attract significant foreign investment capital in the oil and gas
sector. Success in this market will require (1) a realignment of the political
structure, which has and continues to control the oil and gas industry, and
(2) the establishment of a legal and fiscal regime that offers investors stabil-
ity and security.
Kazakhstan is a large country covering approximately 2.7 million
square kilometers. Of the 17 million people living in Kazakhstan, forty
percent are Kazakhs, thirty-eight percent are Russians and five percent are
Germans.1 The country is ethnically diverse with over 100 different ethnic
groups. To date, however, Kazakhstan has witnessed little of the ethnic
tension which has infected the Caucasian republics and the Central Asian
states. Although Kazakhstan is classified by many to be a Muslim country,
only fourteen percent of all Kazakhs are Muslim, and religion has not
affected the political system as compared to other countries in the area.
Because the fundamentalist movement has not had much of an impact in
this basically secular state, President Nazarbayev has successfully avoided
* Copyright 1993. Mr. Derman is Chief Counsel for Oryx Energy Company, a Director of the
Association of International Petroleum Negotiators, and was Chairman of the American Corporate
Counsel Association. He currently serves on the Council of the Texas Bar Association International
Law Section and is Vice Chairman of the Special Committee on International Energy Law of the
American Bar Association's section of Natural Resources, Energy, and Environmental Law. He is a
graduate of Temple Law School. This article was presented at the International Energy Law
Symposium at The University of Tulsa College of Law, Spring 1993.
1. Country Report on Kazakhstan, Kaleidoscope, 1993 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Currnt file.
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becoming entangled in Islamic ideology, and nothing exists on the horizon
which threatens the successful continuation of this strategy. The issue of
language does, however, have the possibility to fracture this apparent
cohesiveness.
Although the official language is Kazakh, most of the population
speaks Russian. President Nazarbayev has skillfully balanced this poten-
tially explosive issue by declaring Kazakh as the offical language, and by
mandating that those speaking Russian should not be subject to discrimina-
tion. The Kazakhstan Constitution states that the "Russian language is the
language of interethnic relations" and the "state guarantees the preserva-
tion of the sphere of use of the language of interethnic relations and other
national languages, and looks after their free development." 2
Kazakhstan is viewed as one of the most stable states of the former
Soviet Union. This is due predominantly to the presence of President
Nazarbayev, a Kazakh. At age 47, he is young, vital and viewed by many as
extremely capable and intelligent with an ability to blend far-sighted polit-
ical vision and pragmatic implementation. President Nazarbeyev
denounced the anti-Gorbachev coup in August 1991, and he has continued
to retain overwhelming support of the populace. Long-term stability is,
however, dependent on the adoption of stable political and legal systems.
Whether Kazakhstan can maintain its current political stability without the
presence of President Nazarbayev is questionable at this time.
In many respects, Kazakhstan and Texas have a lot in common. Both
are endowed with rich oil and gas resources, a petrochemical and chemical
industry, hard mineral deposits, a strong agricultural industry, and a moti-
vated and highly skilled work force. In the oil and gas area, Kazakhstan
produces about 545,000 barrels of oil per day (b/d), of which about 100,000
b/d are exported. Gas production is approximately 8.1 billion cubic meters
per year with associated condensate production of nearly 125,000 b/d.
Crude oil reserves stand at about 16.3 billion barrels. Natural gas reserves
are stated at 1.8 trillion (reserve estimates have been stated to be upwards
of 3 trillion meters) cubic meters and condensate reserves are approxi-
mately nine billion barrels. In addition to oil and gas, Kazakhstan has sub-
stantial hard mineral reserves. It is interesting to note that Kazakhstan
accounted for ninety percent of the chrome reserves of the former Soviet
Union, 50 percent of the tungsten and lead, and forty percent of the zinc
and copper deposits. Kazakhstan was one of the Soviet Union's bread bas-
kets, producing about thirty-three percent of its total agricultural
production.3
Kadyr Baikenov, Minister of Energy and Fuel Resources, stated in a
recent interview4 that by 1994-96 production will increase to 945,000 b/d
2. KAzAKH. CONST. (Supreme Soviet Act, 1993) pmbl., para. 8.
3. See generally Turkey Steps Up Pipeline Pressure as Kazakhs Consider Options, FIN. TuMEs
LimrrED, E. EuR. ENERGY REP., Sept. 24, 1993; Rashmi Nehra, Kazakhstan Has an Abundance of Oil
and Other Resources, Bus. AM., Sept. 6, 1993, at 4; Brian Killen, Ka~akh Oil Output, Exports Hit by
Sulphur Problem, REUTER EuRt. Bus. REP., Sept. 17, 1993.
4. Petroconsultants, Acreage, Laws and Tax, PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WKLY., Dec. 21, 1992.
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and that by the year 2010 production will reach 1.65 million b/d. Interest-
ingly, Minister Baikenov predicts that these increased levels of production
can be achieved without bringing new fields on stream.
Kazakhstan is dependent on a pipeline system that exports oil from
the western portion of the country to Russia and imports oil to the eastern
portion of the country from Russia. Kazakhstan operates one refinery
located in the western region of the country and two refineries in the east-
ern part of the country near the population centers. Total refining capacity
is about 390,000 b/d. Many potential oil and gas investors have spent hours
staring at a map of the region in search of a secure route for an export
pipeline. There is no easy solution.
At the moment, all crude designated for export must flow through the
Russian pipeline system. The prospect of having to use the Russian pipe-
line transportation network operated by Transneft to move Kazakhstan oil
to market does not warm the heart of many a prospective investor. Fur-
thermore, the current chilly environment could worsen if Transneft is split
into separate pipeline entities. In the not too distant future, an exporter
may have to enter into a number of separate transportation agreements
with the individual pipeline entities.
A great deal of effort has been devoted to a pipeline which would
connect production from the Caspian Sea and the Tengiz field to the Rus-
sian port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. This route has been favored
because it is direct; a portion of the not yet built pipeline can benefit from
existing sections of pipeline that can be integrated into the new line. A
portion of the proposed route would, of course, be laid in Russia, connect-
ing to the Russian port of Novorossiysk as the point of export. Questions
as to the security of a line which passes through Russia have been raised,
and this concern has been highlighted by the Russian Supreme Soviet's
inability to ratify the project.
The sponsors of the proposed pipeline are Oman, Kazakhstan, Azer-
baijan and Russia. Each of the sponsors was to ratify the project no later
than February 28, 1993. The project has been ratified by all parties except
Russia. The reason the Russian Supreme Soviet refused to ratify the pro-
ject remains a mystery. Several of the Russian hardliners argued that to
allow such a project to go forward would only compromise the Russian
patrimony in oil and gas. Others argued the economic benefits for Russia
are not sufficient to justify approval. It has been speculated that at least
some in Moscow have no interest in seeing the pipeline project built at this
time. To do so would create additional competition for Russian exports of
crude oil and it could ultimately restrict or eliminate Russian exports of
Siberian crude that feed Kazakhstan's two eastern refineries. On the other
hand, the approval of the Russian Supreme Soviet is typically slow in
materializing.
If all the sponsors agree on this pipeline project, financing will still
have to be arranged. Oman is reported to be involved in the effort to
secure financing. The pipeline is scheduled to be completed three years
after construction begins in earnest. In fact, some of the construction has
19931
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already begun. Bechtel and Williams Brothers have been retained to man-
age construction of the pipeline project. Moreover, the associated infra-
structure will need to be built or expanded. This is especially relevant with
regard to increasing the export capacity at the Russian port of Novoros-
siysk. It is not clear whether producers will have the opportunity to take an
equity and management share in the pipeline. Several companies have
expressed an interest in assuming an equity interest in the pipeline project,
but so far no oil company has become an equity interest owner.
Both Iran and Turkey are working diligently to encourage the routing
of pipeline systems over their territories. A pipeline route over Azerbaijan
and Armenia could be connected or looped into the Turkish pipeline that
was previously used to export Iraqi oil. This Turkish pipeline proposal
would deliver the crude oil to the port of Yumurtalik. Iran has made a
number of proposals to assist Kazakhstan with its export probiem.5
Kazakhstan crude could be exported via a pipeline laid in Iran or, alterna-
tively, Kazakhstan oil could be used to feed Iranian refineries located in
northern Iran and an equivalent amount of oil could be exchanged or taken
at a Gulf export terminal. Discussions regarding exchanges are apparently
being pursued by a number of companies contemplating operations in
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. A dedicated pipeline running from Kazakh-
stan to an export terminal on the Gulf is not economically justified on the
basis of current crude oil projections. This leads inevitably back to the map
of the region in search for another solution.
The bubble of enthusiasm over oil and gas opportunities in Russia has
burst. This is not to say that the situation is irreversible, but companies are
losing interest and enthusiasm is being replaced by critical reticence. Many
companies will wait until the business and legal environment solidifies.
This situation in Russia has both a negative and positive affect on potential
business in Kazakhstan. Since Kazakhstan does not differentiate itself
from Russia in the business and legal environment, some companies are
likely to group both Russia and Kazakhstan together and to associate the
same level of risk with both countries. Moreover, the risk level in Kazakh-
stan is potentially higher because there is no current transportation export
network for oil and gas other than through the Russian pipeline system.
On the positive side, companies are now looking elsewhere, and
Kazakhstan has, at least for the moment, captured the imagination of the
oil industry. Some companies that have developed sizeable databases and
understanding through work in Russia are now attempting to use this
knowledge and experience outside Russia, focusing on Kazakhstan. Other
companies that decided to wait until the environment settled down before
devoting substantial resources in Russia, have looked elsewhere in the for-
mer Soviet Union and have been attracted to Kazakhstan. Still, other com-
panies have followed the "lemming mentality" often seen in the oil and gas
5. Energy Cooperation in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Tehran, Iran (Sept. 1-2, 1992). At this
conference, several papers advocated construction of a pipeline system through Iran or trades for
Iranian crude to move Kazakhstan crude oil to market.
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business and have followed the movement to Kazakhstan because many
competitors are looking for opportunities there.
The question remains whether Kazakhstan will be able to capitalize on
the present situation and put in place a business and legal regime that will
attract real investment in the oil and gas sector. To do so will require the
enactment of a body of law that encourages and protects investment. I
have every reason to believe that Kazakhstan is committed to a policy of
attracting oil and gas investment. But will Kazakhstan be able to create
such a pro-investment environment within the tolerance time frame of
those oil and gas companies currently looking to invest today? With every
passing day, Kazakhstan further delays receiving income from the sale of
its oil and gas. The decrease in the net present value of a two or three year
delay on oil and gas projects can be quite incredible. Therefore, the oil and
gas industry grows increasingly frustrated.
Since Kazakhstan did not obtain its independence until December 16,
1991, the industry is still searching for the map to the labyrinth of doing
business in Kazakhstan. Companies' shareholders and stakeholders
demand tangible results. How long can most companies wait while sizeable
portions of their technical, professional, and managerial staffs are devoting
substantial time to studying and analyzing Kazakhstan's oil and gas poten-
tial and ascertaining how to do business there? A great sage once pro-
nounced that one should strike while the iron is hot. Kazakhstan iron is
made of magma. Kazakhstan needs to seize the moment and move both
boldly and expeditiously to put into place a business and legal regime
which would attract and protect investment.
II. THE LAW
I will approach the analysis of the Kazakhstan law with the assumption
that comprehensive legislation will be passed which addresses oil and gas.
This approach also assumes that the drafters of such legislation will con-
clude that a patchwork quilt of law will at best produce conflict and ambi-
guity and will at worst create a system that does not encourage investment.
The current patchwork of law includes legislation that was passed prior to
the date of independence (December 16, 1991) as well as legislation that
was passed after independence. To date, there is no effective law which
directly addresses oil and gas. One could analyze the myriad of outstand-
ing laws that indirectly affects this by building a framework with what is
currently permitted under the law and extrapolating what rules govern the
oil and gas area. I do not believe that such an analysis is truly helpful. To
illustrate the existence of conflict, ambiguity, and lack of law, I have herein
highlighted those sections of the body of Kazakhstan law that impact the
upstream oil and gas sector. It will soon become obvious that a coordi-
nated approach would be most beneficial.
Potential investors, the Government of Kazakhstan, and the oil and
gas industry need to look forward, not backward. To become overly
embroiled in an effort which attempts to harmonize the present law with a
new oil and gas law would be a mistake. No doubt, the oil and gas law
1993]
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needs to fit into the ,overall legal scheme in Kazakhstan, but our efforts
would yield far greater success if the thrust of our activity focuses on what
should be and not what is. Therefore, I have devoted a great portion of this
paper to what the law conceptually should be. To provide a framework for
this discussion, I have focused on the draft Oil Law that is currently before
the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet.
The draft Oil Law was developed with the assistance of the World
Bank and several other independent third party advisors.6 A number of
very able and skilled individuals assisted an extremely capable group of
Kazakhs in the development of the draft Oil Law. I believe the drafters of
such legislation have created an outstanding foundation upon which to
build. The draft Oil Law needs clarification if it is to be the guiding princi-
ple upon which substantial investment will be made.
My analysis relies upon English translations of Russian versions of
current laws. While I have examined several English translations of many
of these laws, I do not feel truly confident that the English translations
capture their subtle meaning and nuances. In order to give the reader as
accurate a reflection of the law as possible, I have quoted the English trans-
lation verbatim in most instances. This device, no doubt in some instances,
gives the paper a somewhat stilted style. However, I did not want to add to
the confusion by paraphrasing the English translation.
III. THE CONSTrIUrION
The first level of analysis considers the Constitution of the Republic of
Kazakhstan as it addresses oil and gas. The Constitution was adopted on
January 28, 1993.7 The Constitution prohibits direct ownership of oil and
gas. Article 46 of the Constitution states in its entirety, "[tihe land, its
depths, waters, vegetable and animal worlds and other natural resources
are within exclusive state ownership. The limits and subjects of exercising,
in the name of the republic, the right of ownership to stated objects, are
determined by law."8 If one thing is clear, the Republic of Kazakhstan will
retain exclusive ownership over its oil and gas resources.
IV. THE CODE5 ON THE SUBSURFACE AND CRUDE MINERAL
PROCESSING
The next area of examination focuses on the Code on the Subsurface
Resources and Crude Mineral Processing.9 The Code on the Subsurface
was passed on May 30, 1992, some three months after Russia passed similar
legislation. The Code on the Subsurface addresses all subsurface opera-
tions, not just oil and gas. It has been described as umbrella legislation
6. The draft Oil Law was developed from 1992 to 1993.
7. Sergei Kozlov, The Republic Acquires a Constitution, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, Jan. 31, 1993,
at 1.
8. KAzAKH. CONST. (Supreme Soviet Act, 1993) art. 46, paras. 1, 2.
9. LAW (CODE) OF Tiw REPUBuC OF KAZAKHSTAN ON THZ SUBSURFACE RESOURCES AND
CRUDE MINERAL PROCESSINO [CODE ON THE SuBsuRFACE], adopted May 30, 1992.
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from which more detailed legislation will spring. It is questionable whether
the Code on the Subsurface clarifies or confuses the situation. The Code
does, however, establish by law the jurisdiction of various ministries over
extractive and processing operations, perhaps reflecting the drafters' real
intention of the Code on the Subsurface. I discuss the Code on the Subsur-
face and its interaction with the draft Oil Law later in this paper. For now,
I will highlight the most important provisions of the Code on the Subsur-
face as they relate to the oil and gas sector.
Relations relating to the possession, use and disposition of the subsoil
and relations relating to the processing of mineral raw material shall be regu-
lated by the present Code and by other acts of legislation of the Republic of
Kazakhstan issued in accordance therewith .... 
""
... The right of ownership to the subsoil in the Republic of Kazakhstan
shall be effectuated by the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Kazakhstan
through the entire territory of the Republic .... 11
S.. The subsoil shall be granted for use for: 1) geological study; 2) extrac-
tion of minerals; 3) construction and operation of underground installations
not connected with the extraction of minerals, including installations for the
underground storage of oil, gas and other substances and materials, the burial
of harmful substances and production wastes, the discharge of sewage waters,
and the satisfaction of other needs .... 12
... The subsoil may be granted for use to enterprises with foreign partici-
pation and to foreiin juridical and natural persons on conditions of a contract
or concession....
... The subsoil shall be granted for geological study by agencies of the
Ministry of Geology and Protection of the Subsoil of the Republic of Kazakh-
stan to: (1) enterprises, organizations, institutions, and citizens of the Repub-
lic of Kazakhstan on the basis of a project for geological study; (2) enterprises
with foreign participation and foreiin juridical and natural person on the con-
ditions of a contract or concession.
The Republic of Kazakhstan is to grant deposits of "republic signifi-
cance" and the local soviets of people's deputies is to grant deposits of
"local significance."15
"Use" of the subsoil is granted by the Ministry of Geology and
"extraction of minerals and use" is granted by either the Republic of
Kazakhstan for deposits of "republic significance" and the local soviets of
people's deputies for deposits of "local significance."16
10. Id. art. 2.1.
11. Id. art. 5.2.
12. Id. art. 9.
13. Id. art. 10.3.
14. Id. art. 12.1.
15. Id. arts. 13.1, 13.2.
16. Id. arts. 13.3, 13.4.
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"Juridical and natural persons who have financed geological prospect-
ing work shall have a preferential right to exploit the prospected deposit on
conditions of complying with the requirements of the present Code."17
Before a contract can be executed, the investor must obtain a "mining
allotment" from the Ministry of Geology18 and the project must be evalu-
ated by the Ministries of Geology, Ecology and Bioresources and Public
Health as well as the State Committee for the Supervision over the Safe
Conduct of Work in Industry and Mining Supervision. 19
"The use of the subsoil may be for a term or in perpetuity."'2 How-
ever, the right to use the subsoil can be terminated pursuant to an enumer-
ated list of circumstances and in accordance with a specified procedure.2
Authority over the granting and regulatory process is given to the
Supreme Soviet, local soviets, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the State Com-
mission for Mineral Reserves and the Ministry of Geology.22
The results of the geological study of the subsoil of the Republic of
Kazakhstan materialized in bearers of information (maps, tables, textual
annexes and others) shall be the ownership of the customer which effectuated
the financing for the work as a result of which the particular information was
received, unless provided otherwise in the contract .... 23
... Geological and other information on the subsoil of the Republic of
Kazakhstan irrespective of the sources of financing, shall be handed over
without compensation to the Ministry of Geology .... 24
... The realization (or transfer, exchange, sale) of information on the
subsoil shall be effectuated by the Ministry of Geology and the Protection of
the Subsoil of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the procedure established by the
Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Kazakhstan .... 25
Social organizations shall take part in activity directed towards ensur-
ing the protection of the subsoil and the rational and integrated use of mineral
raw material in accordance with their charters (or statutes) and legislation of
the Republic of Kazakhstan .... 26
... Disputes relating to the possession, use, and disposition of the subsoil
and processing of mineral raw material shall be considered by courts and arbi-
trazh courts in the procedure established by legislation of the Republic of
Kazakhstan .... 27
17. Id art. 13.5.
18. Id. art. 15.1.
19. Id. art. 14.2.
20. Id. art. 19.
21. Id. arts. 21, 22.
22. Id. arts. 23-27.
23. Id. art. 37.1.
24. Id. art. 37.3.
25. Id. art. 37.7.
26. Id. art. 67.
27. Id. art. 68.
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*.. Transactions which directly or indirectly violate the right of posses-
sion, disposition, and use of the subsoil shall be deemed to be void .... 28
... Persons guilty of concluding the said transactions, and also other vio-
lations of legislation on the subsoil and processing of mineral raw material,
shall bear disciplinary, material, administrative, and criminal responsibility
established by law.
29
V. OTHER LAWS EF-FcrING THE UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS SECTOR
Many laws currently affect oil and gas operations. Until a comprehen-
sive oil and gas law is adopted, these peripheral laws will continue to
impact oil and gas operations. As discussed above, I have noted those laws
that impact the upstream oil and gas sector and have very briefly high-
lighted the most relevant provisions of these laws.
Property can be owned by foreign persons.30
Objects of the right of ownership shall be regarded earth, its bowels, riv-
ers and lakes, air space, flora and fauna, other natural resources .... 31
... The earth, its bowels, rivers and lakes, air space, flora and fauna,
other natural resources, historic and cultural monuments shall exclusively
belong to the Kazakh SSR .... 3 2
... The Kazakh SSR guarantees stability of property relations established
in compliance with the present law .... 33
... The Kazakh SSR guarantees equality before the law of all forms and
subjects of property and equal protection of their rights.34
Losses caused by government action which terminates proprietary
rights shall be ".... compensated to the proprietor in the full amount by the
body which has taken this decision and by the Kazakh SSR."'35
Confiscation shall only be allowed if accomplished by legislative
action.36 "The Kazakh SSR shall guarantee protection of foreign citizens'
and legal entities' properties located in its territory. '37
Land and other natural resources can be leased. 31
28. Id. art. 70.1.
29. l& art. 70.2.
30. Law of the Kazakh SSR on Property in the Kazakh SSR, adopted December 15, 1990, art. 3.2.
31. 1& art. 2.1.
32. Id. art. 19.1. See also idL art. 24.1.
33. Id. art. 23.1.
34. Id. art. 23.2.
35. Id. art. 23.3.
36. Id. art. 23.4.
37. Id. art. 23.7.
38. LAW OF THE KAZAKH SSR ON LEASE, adopted Feb. 2, 1990, § 1.
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Foreign juridical persons and foreign citizens have the right to engage
in business enterprises of their choice provided that such activities are not
prohibited by law.3 9
Business activities must be registered.4
An entrepreneur can acquire foreign currency at specific auction or
State bank according to acting market-rates. "Confiscation of the entre-
preneur's foreign currency is not permitted." 41
"Foreign citizens as well as citizens without citizenship engaged in eco-
nomic and entrepreneurial activities on the territory of the Kazakh SSR
have equal rights with the citizens of the Kazakh SSR with the exception of
specific norms to these people adjusted by other legal acts."'42
The object of foreign investments on the territory of the Kazakh SSR are
enterprises, share participation in the property of Soviet juridical entities,
share and other securities and such other property as well as the acquired
property rights to use natural resources in the Kazakh SSR for carryin out
the economic and any such activity on the Kazakh SSR territory ....
. Juridical entities with foreign participation including foreign enter-
prises shall have the right to participate in any forms of economic associations
on a voluntary basis ....
F oreign investments shall be allowed in any spheres of economic and
other activity except for production of articles of direct military application
45
The property imported to the republic as investments of foreign
investors and not intended for sale shall not be liable to customs duties. Per-
sonal property of foreign specialists employed at enterprises with foreign par-
ticipation shall be brought into the republic duty-free .... 46
... In the Kazakh SSR the nationalization of enterprises with foreign
participation shall not be allowed. In exceptional cases the property of the
enterprise with foreign participation can be requisitioned in the order speci-
fied by the law. In this case the Kazakh SSR will undertake to compensate to
the foreign investor the losses incurred .. .
... The Kazakh SSR shall guarantee to foreign investors the right of free
transfer abroad of profits from activity and liquidation of juridical entities
with foreign participation as well as from selling their share in said
enterprises .... 4 8
39. LAW OF THE KAZAKH SSR ON FREE ENTERPRISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
IN THE KAZAKCH SSR, adopted Dec. 11, 1990, art. 3.
40. I. art. 10.
41. Id. art. 22.
42. Id. art. 23.
43. LAW OF THE KAZAyK- SSR ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN ThE KAZAKH SSR, adopted on Dec.
7, 1990, art. 3.
44. Id. art. 8.
45. Id. art. 9.
46. Id. art. 16.
47. Id. art. 25.
48. Id. art. 26.
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... Import and export of the Soviet and foreign currency payment docu-
ments and securities shall be regulated by the Kazakh SSR law on currency
regulation ....
* . . Disputes of the juridical entity with foreign participation with the
state organs of the Kazakh SSR as well as disputes between the participants of
juridical entities with foreign participation shall be liable to examination in
the state arbitration organs, in the courts of the Kazakh SSR or upon agree-
ment by the parties-in the court of arbitration under the Kazakh SSR
legislation....
... A free economic zone in the Kazakh SSR is a specially allocated
territory with clearly defined administrative borders and special legal condi-
tions established with the aim of attracting foreign capital, progressive foreign
technology and management experience for accelerated social and economic
development of the territory of the zone .... s
... On the territory of the free economic zone it is permissible to conduct
any economic, financial and other activities of Soviet and foreign legal entities
and citizens except for the production of direct military purpose and those
activities that are not allowable by the Kazakh SSR legislation .... 52
... Any legal entities located outside the zone are entitled to originate
their affiliates or new enterprises including joint ventures on the territory of
the free economic zone ....
... The free economic zone is formed by the resolution of the Supreme
Soviet of the Kazakh SSR on representation of the local Soviets of People's
Deputies based on the opinion of the territory's population. The border of
the zone and the term of validity of special legal conditions on its territory are
determined by the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR....
... Nationalization of the property of citizens of the USSR, the Kazakh
SSR and foreign citizens, enterprises, associations and organizations in opera-
tion on the territory of the free economic zone by the state is
inadmissible .... 55
* . . Losses incurred to the citizens of the USSR, the Kazakh SSR and
foreign citizens, enterprises, associations as a result of groundless interference
of the state and other bodies or officials into their activities are liable to be
compensated by these bodies .... 56
Soviet and foreign businessmen wishing to establish enterprises,
associations and organizations on the territory of the free economic zone or to
49. Md art. 27.
50. Id. art. 28.
51. LAW OF THE KAZAKH SSR ON FREE ECONOMIC ZONES IN THE KAZAKH SSR, adopted
December 15, 1990, art. 1.1.
52. I art. 1.2.
53. I art. 1.3.
54. I art. 2.
55. i art. 4.1.
56. i art. 4.3.
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take part in diverse economic projects should apply to the Administrative
Council of the zone attaching the documents in accordance with the regula-
tions on the zone ....57
... Disputes between legal entities and the Administrative Council of the
zone are considered in the organs of judicature, state arbitration and arbitra-
tion court .... 58
Entities within the free economic zone are given a number of privi-
leges and benefits, most importantly they are exempt "from profits tax
from two to five years from receipt of declared profit." 9
Imported equipment, material, raw materials and other components intended
for production and processing on the territory of the free economic zone and
the product exported from the zone are not liable to -customs duties. The
consumer goods imported to the zone for sale inside it are exempted from
custom duties partially or completely.
60
The conduct of geological exploration and the mining of useful min-
eral deposits requires a license.61 The procedure for granting such license
shall be established by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR.62 The
Kazakh SSR shall guarantee the stability of this law, equal rights for all
enterprises, stable rates of taxes and protection of property.63
The "profits tax rate" is set at a minimum of thirty-five percent for
Kazakhstan companies.' Joint ventures with a thirty percent or more for-
eign ownership are taxed at a rate of thirty percent, unless otherwise stipu-
lated by agreement or contract. 65 Apparently, this rate was reduced to
twenty-five percent, by virtue of a June 30, 1992 law which amended and
supplemented this law. (I have not yet seen translation of the June 30,
1992 law.)
A two-year tax holiday exists for all industries, except mineral
resources and fishing industries.' A sales tax is to be established by the
Cabinet of Ministers.67 A land tax will be imposed.6' A fifteen percent
dividend withholding tax is established.6 9
The United States and the Republic of Kazakhstan have negotiated a
tax treaty to avoid double taxation. The Treaty has not yet been ratified.70
57. Id art. 8.1.
58. Id art. 8.7.
59. I art. 13.1.1.
60. Id art. 15.
61. LAw OF THE KAzAKm SSR ON ENTERPRISES IN THE KAZAKIH SSR, adopted on Feb. 13, 1991,
art. 4.
62. Id. art. 20.
63. Id art. 30.
64. LAW OF THE KAZAK- SSR ON TAXATION OF ENTERPRIsEs, ASSOCIATIONS AND
ORGANIZATIONS, adopted on Feb. 14, 1991, art. 4.
65. Id arts. 5.1(b), 11.
66. Id art. 10.
67. Id. art. 15.
68. Id. art. 22.
69. Id art. 29.
70. See id. art. 33.
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Non-residents may freely import, transfer and remit from abroad to the
Kazakh SSR as well as export, transfer and remit abroad currency values pro-
vided that the indicated currency values were earlier imported, transferred or
remitted to the Kazakh SSR from abroad or acquired in the territory of the
USSR and the Kazakh SSR on a legal basis....
... Non-residents' assets in foreign currency transferred or imported into
the Kazakh SSR with observance of the customs regulations or acquired by
non-residents in the established order in the territory of the USSR and the
Kazakh SSR shall be subject to free entering to accounts and deposits in
Kazvnesheconombank and such other authorized banks of the republic and
may be transferred without restrictions through serving banks or exported
abroad .... 72
... Non-residents may carry out currency operations including purchase
and sale of currency values only through Kazvnesheconombank ....
.. Assets of non-residents in the USSR currency obtained as a result of
selling foreign currency to Kazvnesheconombank may be sold back to
Kazvnesheconombank for foreign currency and the sales proceeds may be
freely transferred or exported back....
... In a free economic zone the rouble and freely convertible currency
shall be in circulation. Settlements between legal entities in the territory of
the zone shall be performed in any currency upon the parties decision and
agreement.75
Participants of foreign economic relations of the Kazakh SSR are
bound not later than October 1, 1991: to open foreign currency accounts
with the Kazvnesheconombank or with other Republics banks which are
authorized to keep foreign currency accounts; to transfer all foreign cur-
rency deposits located in the outside banks or foreign banks unless other-
wise approved by the Republic's government 76
To rescind the force in the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan of all
normative acts, passed by organs of the former Union of SSR, on taxation of
import and export of goods (work, services), on customs tariffs and
barters ....
... To prohibit in the territory of the Kazakh SSR any forms of settle-
ments and payments in foreign currency between legal entities, as well as
between legal entities and citizens, except for labour pay.
78
71. LAW OF THE KAZAKH SSR ON CURRENCy REGULATIONS IN THE KAZAHo SSR, adopted June
13, 1991, art. 14.1.
72. Id. art. 14.2.
73. Id. art. 14.3.
74. Id. art. 14.4
75. Id art. 15.4.
76. Decree by President of the Kazakh SSR To Ensure Independence of External Economic
Activities of the Kazakh SSR, issued Aug. 31, 1991, art. 7.
77. Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Organization of the Foreign
Economic Activity of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the Period of Economic Stabilization of and
Effecting Market Transformations, issued on Jan. 25, 1992, art. 5.
78. Id. art. 6.
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"The security subjects are property rights, which may be alienated, in
particular, the right to development and use of mineral deposits, lease
rights to enterprises, constructions, buildings, erections, debt demands,
copyrights, invention laws and other property rights. ' '79  Can a foreign
entity who holds a risk sharing contract grant a security interest in its inter-
est in such a risk sharing contract where the foreign entity does not own the
hydrocarbons until produced?
The present Law establishes the order of a formation and use of cus-
toms tariff, being a system of customs duties, applying when importing to
the customs territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan and exporting outside
this territory goods and other things; as well as the regulations of imposing
customs duties upon these goods and things.8 0 While this law likely
imposes customs duties on upstream oil and gas operations, exemptions are
explicitly contemplated and can be granted pursuant to legislative acts of
the Republic of Kazakhstan.81
The Value Added Tax (VAT) is set at twenty-eight percent.82 It is
questionable whether VAT would apply to an oil and gas exploration and
production venture.
The April 10, 1992 Decree introduced a forty percent export tax on oil
and gas.83 The October 9, 1992 Decree reduced the export tax to thirty
percent for oil and twenty percent for gas.8
The Ministiy of Geology and Protection of Natural Resources by vir-
tue of Decree No. 1034 is given the exclusive right to sell all geological
data, that is data owned by the Government and data owned by third party
oil companies.8 5
VI. THE DRAFr OIL LAW
The draft Oil Law" establishes a good foundation from which a sound
and lasting oil and gas law can be created. The draft Oil Law could be
improved without a significant rewrite of the Law and this analysis will
highlight some of the deficiencies in the draft Oil Law and offer suggestions
for improvement.
To attract capital at the lowest possible cost, Kazakhstan will need to
convince investors that its legal regime will allow oil and gas operations to
be conducted in an efficient manner and that investments and property
79. LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAzAKHSTAN ON SECURITY, adopted on Dec. 23, 1991, art. 27.
80. LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN ON CUSTOMS TARIFF AND CUSTOMS DuTEs,
adopted on Dec. 24, 1991, art. 1.
81. 1l art. 17.
82. LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN ON VALUE ADDED TAX, adopted on Dec. 24, 1991,
art. 6.
83. Decree No. 716 of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, issued on Apr. 10, 1992.
84. Decree No. 845 of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, issued on Oct. 9, 1992.
85. Decree No. 1034 of the Republic of Kazakhstan Council of Ministers on Regulations
Governing the ftansfer, Exchange and Sale of Geological Information in the Kazakhstan Republic,
issued 1992.
86. The draft Oil Law was tailored by the Kazakhstan Oil Law Drafting Commission to address
the perceived political sensitivities of the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet.
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rights will be protected. To do so requires a clear, unambiguous legal
regime that meets these objectives. The current state of the law relating to
upstream oil and gas is anything but clear. The above discussion of the
current law illustrates the need for a well-written comprehensive oil and
gas law.
The threshold issue involves the interplay between the Code on the
Subsurface Resources and Crude Mineral Processing and the draft Oil
Law. Will the draft Oil Law supersede and supplant the Code on the Sub-
surface Resources? Will this result only occur where the draft Oil Law
explicitly so provides? As it now stands, the draft Oil Law and the Code
on the Subsurface Resources conflict either explicitly or implicitly in a
number of instances. Should we assume that the rule of construction in
Kazakhstan is that the law enacted subsequent in time governs, notwith-
standing that the subsequently enacted law, namely the Oil Law, fails to
explicitly reference this conflict?
In this regard, it is interesting to note that the Decree of the President
of the Republic of Kazakhstan' rescinds all normative acts of the former
Soviet Union, on taxation of import and export of goods. This Decree nul-
lified laws that affected the taxation of imports and exports.' Apparently,
the President believed such action was necessary or advisable and that
without such rescission the enactment of additional legislation relating to
import and exports taxes would be potentially in conflict with prior legisla-
tion. Perhaps the President felt this was necessary only because the prior
legislation was enacted by the former Soviet Union.
Investors will, of course, desire the most stable, least ambiguous
regime. It would, therefore, be advisable for the draft Oil Law to explicitly
amend the Code on the Subsurface Resources where applicable. I under-
stand that a draft oil and gas law proposed by the World Bank included a
provision that stated that the Code on the Subsurface Resources and other
legislation regulating oil and gas operations would be effective to the
extent that these laws were not in conflict with the oil and gas law. The
current draft Oil Law seems to adopt the opposite approach. 9
VII. DETAIL
It is proper to title the legislation the "Oil Law of the Republic of
Kazakhstan" even though it addresses oil and gas, because the definition of
"oil" includes gas. While I believe the English translation of the Russian
word "Nyeft" includes both oil and gas, it would perhaps be better to use
the word "petroleum" in lieu of the word "oil." The definition of the word
"petroleum" is identical to that of "crude," so there would be no real sub-
stantive change. The use of the word "petroleum" is clearer (at least in
87. Decree of President of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Organization of the Foreign Economic
Activity of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the Period of Economic Stabilization of and Effecting
Market Transformations, issued on Jan. 25, 1992.
88. Id
89. The preamble (not so specified) provides that the draft Oil Law governs "... and acts in
conjunction with other laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan."
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English) since it has the connotation of covering both oil and gas. More-
over, the use of the term "Petroleum Law" is more customary. Perhaps,
this is just a matter of translation. Some of my concerns may be created by
the lack of a perfect translation. Construction of words is an exacting effort
to most lawyers. This is especially true in the oil and gas field where an
established body of law is rooted in a highly sophisticated, technologically-
oriented industry that is evolving rapidly. I have endeavored to identify
those instances where the translation could be the cause of my concern.
VIII. Two CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
Now that I have addressed this relatively minor detail I will discuss
what I see as the most critical concern. What governmental entities will be
authorized to grant rights of ownership over oil and gas interests?
Throughout the former Soviet Union, there has been much concern over
who can grant/award oil and gas interests and the property interest an
investor acquires by virtue of such grant/award.
Several provisions of the draft Oil Law address the granting/awarding
of licenses. Article 2(2) provides that the ownership of oil is defined by
contract and by the draft Oil Law.90 Article 2(3) states that an investor has
the right to dispose of the produced oil.91
Article 4 gives the Government of Kazakhstan the authority to create
a "competent body" which appears to have a rather wide-reaching jurisdic-
tion.92 The competent body, upon the direction of the Government, is
given authority to:
[D]efine tracts, fields and types of oil operations ... conduct direct negotia-
tions.., declare a competition or auction and its conditions ... define the
forms of cooperation... draw up standard contracts to be approved by the
Govemet. .. onduct an outside expert review of the cntracts . . to
monitor implementation of the terms and conditions of the contract.., to
conduct negotiations and enter into agreements with the corresponding agen-
cies of any state to obtain rights that secure the possibility of building a pipe-
line and other means of transport for operations within another state in order
to ensure export of. oil.93
Many questions are left unresolved. How much authority will the
competent body have to act without approval of the government? Will the
government have to approve anyrevision to a standard contract that it has
previously approved? Exactly what government entity will oversee and
approve the actions of the competent authority? What will the approval
process entail and how long will the process take?
Aiticle 9 provides that "the procedure for conclusion of contracts shall
be defined by the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan." 94 In sum-
mary, the Government of Kazakhstan is given broad authority to regulate
90. Draft Oil Law, art. 2(2).
91. Id art. 2(3). It does vot say that exorbitant taxes may not be imposed.
92. Id. art. 4.
93. Id art. 4.1.
94. Id art. 8.1.
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the granting/awarding of oil and gas contracts. The local government agen-
cies are only authorized to grant a "land parcel." This authorization is sub-
ject to a few restrictions, such as the minimum size and form of a block.95
Once again, what government organization will approve contracts negoti-
ated by the competent entity? Will oil and gas companies be required to
deal with competing, central, government organizations or one government
entity? In other words, will the competent body report and be governed by
one government entity or will the competent body be a pawn in the com-
peting aspirations of several government entities? The present situation is
especially frustrating; will it improve? The draft legislation does not neces-
sarily resolve this confusion.
The Code on the Subsurface Resources only adds to this confusion.
Article 12.3 of the Code authorizes the Ministry of Geology and Protection
of the Subsoil to issue geological study licenses.' Moreover, Article 13.2
provides that the Ministry of Geology is to participate in the "allocation of
the subsurface or any use."'  The Republic of Kazakhstan is authorized by
the Code to grant production licenses on "mineral deposits of national sig-
nificance."9 Apparently, smaller fields (called "mineral deposits of local
significance") can be granted by local soviets of people's deputies. 9 These
terms - mineral deposits of "national" and "local" significance - are not
defined. Do Articles 13.2 and 13.3 give the Ministry of Geology authority
to participate in the granting of all exploration contracts and all develop-
ment contracts? Since nothing in the draft Oil Law supplants the Code,
one could argue that the Ministry of Geology is required by law to grant
exploration contracts and has the right to participate in production
contracts.
Currently, the Ministry of Energy and Fuel Resources is taking the
lead in granting oil and gas contracts on already proven fields. For exam-
ple, it is the Ministry of Energy and Fuel Resources that negotiated the
huge Tengiz project with Chevron. Does the Ministry of Geology have the
right to participate in the granting of such a contract? What happens if the
Ministry of Geology believes it has not had sufficient influence over such
negotiations? What is the role of the competent body? Can the Ministry
of Energy and Fuel Resources grant or approve a contract covering acre-
age that is primarily exploratory in nature, without the approval of the
Ministry of Geology? How are approvals to be given? Are two (or more)
Government Ministries required to sign such contracts?
The Code on the Subsurface and Crude Mineral Processing exacer-
bates the confusion and inertia by providing that "[t]ransactions which
directly or indirectly violate rights of ownership, disposition and use of the
subsoil shall be deemed to be invalid."'1 Furthermore, "[p]ersons guilty of
95. Id art. 10.1.
96. CODE ON THE SUBSURFACE, art. 12.3.
97. Id art. 13.2.
98. Id art. 13.3.
99. Id.
100. Id. art. 70.1.
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concluding the said transactions, and also other violations of legislation on
the subsoil and processing of mineral raw materials, shall bear disciplinary,
material, administrative, and criminal responsibility established by law.' 1
0 1
While including such provisions is understandable and admirable, these
provisions do not provide a great deal of incentive to take initiative in an
area which has the potential to be politically charged and is both unsettled
and evolving. Unless the governing rules for granting/awarding contracts
are unambiguous, the responsible government officials will be reluctant to
move without clear authority from above and the oil companies will not be
satisfied until the contract is full of signatures or has been endorsed by the
Supreme Soviet and signed into law.
Moving outside the government ministries, what is the role of the
Republic of Kazakhstan Cabinet of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet?
Article 23 of the Code on the Subsurface gives the Supreme Soviet signifi-
cant authority over this process.1°2 On another level, what if the local sovi-
ets of people's deputies claim that the field is within their scope of
authority as being a "mineral deposit of local significance" prior to the
Supreme Soviet confirmation of the field as a deposit of "republic signifi-
cance"? 10 3 The Law of the Kazakh SSR on Enterprises in the Kazakh SSR,
adopted on February 13, 1991, provides that the procedure for granting
licenses for exploration and mining of useful minerals shall be established
by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR.cM What is the role of the
Cabinet of Ministers in light of the draft Oil Law?
If this is not confusing enough, Article 14.2 of the Code on the Subsur-
face requires that before a "mining allotment" (this term is not defined) is
granted, the contract shall be evaluated by the Republic of Kazakhstan
Ministry of Geology and Subsurface Protection, the Republic of Kazakh-
stan Ministry of Ecology and Bioresources, the Republic of Kazakhstan
State Committee for Oversight of Work Safety and Mining Inspection and
the Republic of Kazakhstan Ministry of Health.10 5 As the law is currently
written, the competent body will be quite busy obtaining approvals from a
whole host of other government organizations before it can take action.
In summary, the draft Oil Law does little if anything to expedite and
clarify the process for granting/awarding of contracts. Oil and gas compa-
nies will be reticent to move forward on any significant project without
obtaining both the endorsement of the full Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet
and the signature of the President. For example, even though Elf Aqui-
taine's contract preceded the enactment of the Code on the Subsurface, Elf
sought endorsement of its contract from the Supreme Soviet. When it
became clear that a fuf Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet endoysement wvould be
difficult to obtain in the near term, Elf settled for a decree of the Presidium
101. Id art. 70.2.
102. Id art. 23.
103. This one issue may be ameliorated by virtue of Articles 23.1(6) and 25(9) if the Republic of
Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet approves a list of "mineral deposits of repulblic significance" expeditiously.
104. LAw OF THE KAZAKH SSR ON EmmRpEs.s iN THE KAZAK- SSR, adopted on Feb. 13,1991.
105. CODE ON THE SUBSU-FAcE, art. 14.2.
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of the Soviet. Chevron has obtained presidential confirmation of its con-
tract in principal. Apparently, Chevron will not request endorsement of
the full Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet for its contract.
The draft Oil Law needs to do more to clarify and expedite the process
for granting/awarding contracts. First, the draft Oil Law must explicitly
provide that it controls, regulates, and governs all exploration, develop-
ment, and production operations and that the draft Oil Law is superior to
and supersedes all laws, decrees, and regulations of any kind that are in
conflict with the draft Oil Law. Second, the competent body must have a
great deal of authority and independence to act without obtaining approv-
als from many other government entities.
My second concern involves the multitude of government entities
charged with overseeing and regulating oil and gas operations. Pursuant to
the draft Oil Law, the following government entities are involved in over-
seeing and regulating oil and gas operations: 1) The Government of
Kazakhstan;1" 2) Local state agencies;" and 3) The competent body.
The Code on the Subsurface is even more expansive when it comes to
overseeing and regulating oil and gas operations. Pursuant to the Code,
the following government entities are involved in overseeing and regulating
oil and gas operations: 1) The Government of Kazakhstan Cabinet of Min-
isters, a host of ministries are explicitly given such authority; 2) The Minis-
try of Geology and Subsurface Protection; 3) The Ministry of Ecology and
Bioresources; 4) The Ministry of Public Health; 5) The State Committee for
Oversight of Work Safety and Mining Inspection; 6) Regional Soviets of
People's Deputies; 7) District and City Soviets of People's Deputies; 8)
Local state agencies; 9) The State Commission for Mineral Reserves.
No doubt, under the rubric of the Government of Kazakhstan, many
other ministries will seek to involve themselves in oil and gas operations. It
is reasonable to expect that the Ministry of Energy and Fuel Resources will
play a role. Moreover, the Ministries of Foreign Relations and Economy
will likely try to become involved, as will other ministries. This list does
not consider non-government entities, such as citizen groups, that are
explicitly discussed in Article 17 of the Code on the Subsurface. Finally,
under the Law of the Kazakh SSR on Enterprises in the Kazakh SSR, what
role, if any, will the Cabinet of Ministers play?
It is questionable whether the overlapping jurisdiction of so many enti-
ties is really in the best interest of either Kazakhstan or oil and gas compa-
nies considering investment in Kazakhstan. Efficiency cries out for a
substantial reduction in the number of entities that are authorized to over-
see and regulate oil and gas operations.
106. No doubt, the Ministry of Geology and Subsurface Protection and the Ministry of Energy and
Fuel Resources, and perhaps other ministries as well.
107. The number of agencies is not defined or limited.
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XI. ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT OIL LAW
Article 1. Definitions
It is customary that defined words and terms are capitalized when used
in the text. By capitalizing these words and terms, the reader is made
aware or reminded that such words or terms have been defined. I suggest
that such a methodology be followed.
Article 2. Right of Ownership of Oil
It is absolutely critical that the contractor be given the right to freely
export and sell its oil and gas production. The institution of export quotas,
export licenses, and/or repatriation regulations should not be raised as
impediments to the free export and sale of oil and gas. While Article 2.3
does not raise such concerns, it is a very short, rather non-descriptive provi-
sion. Article 2.3 states in its entirety "[t]he right of disposition of oil
brought to the surface shall rest with the owner, unless otherwise specified
in the contract." 10 8 Considering the critical nature of this provision, it
would be advisable to expand this provision to explicitly address the above
issues. Unless investors are absolutely convinced that an issue has been
fully addressed to their satisfaction, they will consider the matter somewhat
risky and will adjust their economics accordingly.
It is unclear whether this provision supersedes the Law of the Kazakh
SSR on Currency Regulations in the Kazakh SSR to the extent that the
Currency Law imposes requirements on oil and gas exporters. 109
Article 3. Competence of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan
Article 3.2 permits the Government to mandate that certain acreage is
exempt from being used for oil and gas operations. Article 3.2 states if
"territories on-which conduct of oil operations is temporarily prohibited for
reasons of national security, the need to create a strategic reserve, or dan-
ger to the environment shall be defined by the Republic of Kazakhstan
Supreme Soviet at the representation of the Government of the Republic
of Kazakhstan."110 I assume a decision on exempting acreage will be made
prior to the granting/awarding of such acreage and the signing of a con-
tract. If this is the intent of the drafters of this section, a short sentence on
point would clarify the matter and limit the risk to prospective investors.
No investor wants to find out that all or a portion of its contract area has
been declared off-limits, especially if such declaration is issued after hydro-
carbons have been found.
Article 3.3 provides that "[njo legal or physical person may conduct
any oil operations in the Republic of Kazakhstan without signing a contract
and receiving a license from the Government or an authorized state agency
108. Draft Oil Law, art. 2.3.
109. Evidently, this provision does not mean that export tariffs cannot be imposed. As discussed
above, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 845 there is a 30% tariff on the export of oil and a 20%
tariff on the export of gas. See supra note 84.
110. Draft Oil Law, art. 3.2.
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on terms and conditions specified by legislation of the Republic of Kazakh-
stan.""' Is the reference to "a license" in Article 3.3 the same as "a mining
allotment" in Article 14.2 of the Code on the Subsurface? Will the compe-
tent body grant this "license" or will it be granted by another government
entity? Why are alternative government entities given authority to issue
"licenses?" What does the reference to legislation mean, current legisla-
tion (if so, cross references would be helpful) or prospective legislation?
What role, if any, will the Cabinet of Ministers play in the process of grant-
ing licenses? 11
2
Article 4. The Competent Body and its Rights and Obligations
It would certainly expedite the process of moving forward with oil and
gas operations if the competent body would be named in the draft Oil Law.
As written, another piece of legislation needs to be enacted to name the
competent body. As previously discussed, the competent body should be
given a fair amount of jurisdiction. The fewer government entities
involved, the more efficient the operations will be. Article 4 delineates the
jurisdiction of the competent body." 3
Article 5. Competence of Local State Agencies
Local state agencies are given broad authority under the draft Oil Law
to oversee and regulate operations. This authority is rather unrestricted
and could act to impede development operations unless coordinated with
the competent body and other government entities responsible for similar
functions. Local state agencies are given authority to:
grant land parcels .... participate in the development and implementation...
of the oil and gas sector .... monitor the protection of land parcels .... halt
unauthorized use of the subsurface resources for oil operations .... take part
in negotiations ... to resolve... socioeconomic and ecological interests of the
public .... and to... receive in full the signing bonus and lease parynent...
from 20 to 50 percent of the bonus from production and royalties. '
In addition to problems of overlapping jurisdiction, this provision pits
the local government against the central government. Obviously, the local
authorities will aggressively seek signing and lease bonuses, as they receive
100 percent of the share of such payments. The central authorities may
have a somewhat different view of the importance of signing and lease
bonuses and likely will focus more on production bonuses and royalties,
where they share in the payment. In this regard, it is interesting to note
that Article 8.2 of the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Payment
for Use of the Subsurface gives the Republics 50 percent of such payments
to the extent they are derived from deposits of "national significance" and
111. Id art. 3.3.
112. See LAW OF THE KAzAKI-I SSR ON ENmPE, usEs n m KAzAxH SSR, adopted on Feb. 13,
1991.
113. See draft Oil Law, art. 4.
114. Id. art. 5.
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25 percent of such payments to the extent they are derived from deposits of
"local significance." 115
Finally, one could conclude that Article 5 of the draft Oil Law man-
dates that signing bonuses, lease payments, royalties, and production
bonuses are to be paid pursuant to the negotiations and terms of the con-
tract.116 To require that all these burdens be imposed would severely limit
the Kazakhstan negotiating entity's (competent body's) flexibility and
might well retard or economically prohibit the exploration and develop-
ment of certain areas. I suspect that this concept did not come through
well in the translation. To clarify this concern, the words "if any" could be
inserted after each of the burdens or the sentence could be reworded to
ensure that the competent authority has the discretion, but not the require-
ment to impose these burdens in the contract.
Article 6. Types of Contracts
Assuming a relatively expansive interpretation of the types of con-
tracts listed, this provision should aid in the attraction of investment. Arti-
cle 6 states in its entirety:
1. The following types of contracts shall be used in the Republic of
Kazakhstan for oil operations: a contract for division of the product; a
contract for provision of services; a concessions contract. 2. Depend-
ing on the conditions of specific oil operations and other obligations,
combined and other forms of contract shall be allowed.1 7
Article 7. Effective Length, Terms, and Conditions of Contracts
Article 7.1 provides that the "effective length, terms, and conditions of
a contract shall be determined by agreement of the parties in accordance
with the law of the Republic of Kazakhstan that is in force at the time of
signing of the contract." '18 This is an excellent start. The parties should
determine the length, terms, and conditions of the contract. I have a con-
cern with the, second part of this sentence. Are only laws in force applica-
ble? Will legislation enacted subsequent to the execution of the contract
be applicable? If this is the intent of the provision, it should be made clear.
There are potential conflicts within the current legislation with regard
to the length, term, and/or conditions as they relate to oil and gas contracts.
For example, the Code on the Subsurface (which is explicitly cited in Arti-
cle 7.2 as a law that is to be followed) states in Article 19.1 that the "use of
the subsurface may be for a term or in perpetuity."'119
Article 7.6 limits contract extensions to situations where "especially
complex geological conditions" exist or where "additional work" is neces-
115. LAW OF THE REPUBi-iC OF KAZAKHSTAN ON THE PAYMENT FOR USE OF THE SUBSURFACE,
art. 8.2.
116. Draft Oil Law, art. 5.
117. 1I art. 6.
118. 1I art. 7.1.
119. CODE ON THE SUBSURFACE, art. 19.1.
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sary.12 ° Why limit the discretion of the competent body? It would be
advisable to delete such limitations. (I assume the word "contract" should
be written as "contractor.")
Article 8. Procedure For Conclusion and Registration of Contracts
This short article provides that the "procedure for conclusion of con-
tracts shall be defined by the Government of Kazakhstan" '121 and that con-
tracts shall be registered as prescribed by the Code on the Subsurface. 122
The Code on the Subsurface basically appoints the Ministry of Geology as
the registering entity. Laws that are to be interpreted in conjunction with
other unnamed legislation or that include many cross references often
cause confusion with regard to their interpretation. Moreover, the amend-
ment process is made more difficult. Consequently, a uniform single body
of law is a desirable objective.
Article 9. Conditions of Oil Operations
Article 9.2 is subject to misinterpretation. Article 9.2 states in its
entirety, "[iun case of a commercial find, the contractor shall be granted the
right to compensation for expenses in accordance with the terms and condi-
tions of the contract."12 Oil and gas companies will spend time and money
looking for hydrocarbons in Kazakhstan for the simple goal of producing
and selling the production. What is meant by the phrase "right to compen-
sation for expenses?" Does this phrase relate in any way to Article 13.5 of
the Code on the Subsurface, which gives those that have financed and
found hydrocarbons "a preferential right to exploit the prospected
deposit?" I certainly hope not.
Article 9.2 probably means that the contract, for example, a produc-
tion-sharing contract, will provide for cost recovery.124 Unless the "right to
compensation for expenses" includes the right to produce, take, and sell
the production to recover expenses and earn a profit, no oil company is
likely to spend money in Kazakhstan. This provision should be clarified.
Alternatively, if the provision does not address the fact that cost recovery
features should be included in a contract, the provision should be greatly
expanded to clarify exactly what is intended.
Article 10. Size of the Contract Territory and Terms and Conditions of
its Return
Article 10 provides that the blocks awarded shall be "predominately of
rectangular form,""~ determined by the competent authority, and they
shall be at least 350 square kilometers in size. "Expansions of the contract
120. Draft Oil Law, art. 7.6.
121. Id. art. 8.1.
122. Id. art. 8.2.
123. Id. art. 9.2.
124. See id.
125. Id. art. 10.
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territory shall be resolved supplementally or through a separate con-
tract."126 In addition, Article 10.1 could provide that the contractor and
the competent body may agree on how to handle boundary expansions in
the contract. Many host government contracts contain provisions address-
ing the expansion of contractual boundaries in the event a discovered field
extends beyond the boundary of the contract.
Article 11. Oil Operations in Territorial Waters
Article 11.1 provides that "oil operations in territorial waters of the
Republic of Kazakhstan (seas, lakes, rivers) shall be regulated by special
legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.' ' 127 This future legislation
should be consistent, to whatever extent possible, with the "on-shore Oil
Law." To ensure consistency, it would be advisable to have a single law
that covers both on-shore and the offshore oil and gas operations. Activi-
ties that are predominantly on-shore, but that include operations on or
under a lake or river, will have to await future legislation which may delay
a project. Perhaps, the draft Oil Law could govern all oil and gas opera-
tions, except certain operations relating to activity in the Caspian Sea.
Certain operations relating to the Caspian Sea could be further governed
by special regulations or by subsequent legislation.
Article 12. Right to the Republic of Kazakhstan to Acquire Oil
Article 12.1 states that the "Republic of Kazakhstan has the priority
right to acquire oil from the share of a foreign or national state contractor
at world market prices" and the amount, procedure, and currency used
shall be stipulated in the contract. The conditions of acquisition are to be
determined by the Republic of Kazakhstan. 12 This provision delays the
negotiations of a very important and sensitive issue for another day - the
contract negotiation stage. It would be helpful to define the term "world
market price" to make crystal clear that the price paid will be the price a
willing seller will sell the oil and/or gas to the willing buyer, pursuant to an
arms length transaction.
Article 13. Requisition of and Compensation for Oil
Article 13.1 states that in the event of "war, natural disaster, or other
extraordinary circumstances specified by current law, the Republic of
Kazakhstan has the right to requisition part of all of the oil that belongs to
the contractor., 29 And that the "Republic of Kazakhstan guarantees the
contractor compensation for the oil in kind, or monetary compensation at
world market prices in force during the extraordinary circumstances."' 30
As written, this provision will concern investors a great deal. The provision
126. md. art. 10.1.
127. I1& art. 11.1.
128. Im. arts. 12.1, 12.2.
129. Id. art. 13.1.
130. Id
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does not address the payment procedure, interest or timing (if in-kind pro-
duction is substituted), nor the currency used to make payment. Moreover,
as in Article 12.1 the term "world market price" is not defined.
At a minimum, Article 13.1 should track the language of Article 12.1's
second sentence. This is an extremely important matter and it should not
be overlooked. Investors will be very reluctant to spend significant sums in
Kazakhstan if there is any risk that their production/income stream will be
taken without immediate payment in hard currency. In a host of recently
enacted laws, the Republic of Kazakhstan has guaranteed that investments
and property will not be taken, or if taken, compensation will be paid.
Some of these legislative guarantees will be discussed later in the paper in
connection with the discussion of Article 29, which addresses such
guarantees.
Article 14. State Monitoring of the Conduct of Oil Operations
For the reasons discussed above, I believe the draft Oil Law should
explicitly authorize the fewest possible government entities to monitor,
oversee, and regulate oil and gas operations. This provision does just the
opposite. Article 14 states in its entirety, "[sitate monitoring of the conduct
of oil operations shall be provided by state agencies (within their compe-
tence) in accordance with current law of the Republic of Kazakhstan.' 131
It provides that various, unnamed state agencies will have jurisdiction. If
left unbridled, nearly all bureaucracies will run rampant. Legislation is
necessary to restrain the bureaucracies.
Does the term "current law" mean the same as "present law"? I
assume the answer is yes and the translation should be clarified.
132
Article 15. Rights of Contractor
Article 15 bestows certain customary rights on the contractor. The
contractor has the following rights: exclusive operations, use of the con-
tract territory to build production and social facilities, "use of general facili-
ties and service lines both within and outside the contract territory,"'133 use
of subcontractors, disposal of "its share oil (product) and associated com-
ponents that belong to it,,,' 34 use of affiliates, preferences regarding exten-
sions of the contract and right to terminate the contract.' 3
5
It is unclear why the contractor is not just given the right to dispose of
its share of oil (oil being a defined term which covers "crude oil and natural
gas and also includes hydrocarbons made from crude oil, natural gas, fuel
shales, or tar sands"). Does this definition not cover oil, gas, and associ-
ated products? Why does Article 15 not use the defined term "oil"?
131. Id. art. 14.
132. See id. arts. 20(1), 21(1), 26(1), 29(1).
133. Id. art. 15.
134. Id.
135. Id. art. 15.1.
19931
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
Instead it states the contractor has the right to "dispose of its share of oil
(product) and associated components."
Moreover, this Article should contain a provision that gives the con-
tractor a non-discriminatory right to gain access to the oil and gas export
transportation networks for reasonable tariffs. Access to the export net-
work is extremely important and such a provision helps reassure potential
investors that they will be able to move their production to market.
In addition, the Article would be improved if it provided that no
import taxes, duties, and/or levies of whatever type shall be applied against
equipment and machinery brought into Kazakhstan for use in oil and gas
operations. Such a provision could also be incorporated into Article 21.
This recommendation is buttressed by the Law of the Kazakh SSR on For-
eign Investments in the Kazakh SSR, adopted on December 7, 1990, which
states that "[t]he property imported to the republic as investments of for-
eign investors and not intended for sale shall not be liable to customs
duties. Personal property of foreign specialists employed at enterprises
with foreign participation shall be brought into the republic duty-free."'
1 36
Article 16. Obligations of the Contractor
This Article enumerates the obligations of the contractor. The obliga-
tions, with a couple of exceptions, are fairly customary. For example, the
contractor is obligated to employ world-industry practices, observe the laws
of Kazakhstan and international legal norms, follow good safety practices,
give preference to Kazakhstan service companies to the extent they are
competitive, provide progress reports to the competent body, provide
information and access to its facilities to government monitoring agencies,
keep certain information confidential; furnish geological and geophysical
information as required by the Code on the Subsurface, pay taxes and
make other payments promptly; participate in the development of the
social infrastructure; preserve facilities of cultural and historical signifi-
cance, and restore "land parcels" and other natural features. 137
I have three comments regarding Article 16. First, the contractor must
observe the legal requirements of Kazakhstan, and in the absence of such
laws must observe "international norms.' 38 What exactly is meant by the
term "international norms?" I question whether it is advisable to reference
a term in such an important law that cannot be more specifically defined.
The use of hard-to-define general terms opens the door to arbitrary and
capricious actions. As discussed previously, I firmly believe that the draft
Oil Law should supersede other related legislation. While contractors are
subject to the laws of Kazakhstan, in so far as the Oil Law relates to oil and
gas operations, the draft Oil Law should control.
136. LAW OF THE KAZAKH SSR ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN THE KAZAKH SSR, adopted on Dec.
7, 1990, art. 16.
137. Draft Oil Law, art. 16.1.
138. Id art. 16.
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Second, it is unusual for an oil and gas law to explicitly provide that
the investor participate in the development of the social infrastructure.
Well-run companies will assist in the development of the social infrastruc-
ture in the environment they operate. This provision provides that such
social participation will be made in accordance with the contract. Obvi-
ously, significant, contractually-mandated social spending will affect the
project's economics and, in some instances, determine whether a project
proceeds.
Third, the last sentence speaks about restoring the "land parcels and
other natural features" (which I assume to be the surface) to a "condition
suitable for future use. ' 139 What does this provision mean? Does the draft
Oil Law look to the "use" given to the surface prior to operations? Alter-
natively, is the draft Oil Law mandating "use" of the surface in a prospec-
tive sense? I assume it is the former, but even that is somewhat ambiguous.
A little clarification here or a reference to specific requirements as stated
in the contract would be helpful.
Article 17. Right of Ownership of a Trunk Pipeline
This provision states that "trunk pipelines" may be owned by the state
"or other ownership."'14 I assume a "trunk pipeline" is a major export
line. The term is not defined and should be. I also assume that the phrase
"or other ownership" means that foreign companies can own all or a por-
tion of such "trunk pipeline." Once again, I would encourage clarification.
If a foreign company can own a "trunk pipeline," I assume they can also
own smaller gathering lines. Why not state that all pipelines can be owned
in whole or in part by contractors? Article 17.2 simply states that the
"management of a trunk pipeline shall be handled by its owner, unless
otherwise specified in the contract."
Article 18. Operation of a Trunk Pipeline
Article 18 in a general manner addresses some of the operational and
safety issues related to "trunk pipelines." ' Article 18.2 states that
"[e]nergy-supply enterprises are prohibited to implement operational
measures to restrict prescribed limits on energy consumption without the
approval of the owner of the trunk pipeline." '142 The reference to "opera-
tional measures to restrict prescribed limits on energy consumption"1 43 is
not totally clear. Perhaps, the translation could be improved.
139. id
140. Id art. 17.1.
141. Id art. 18.
142. Id. art. 18.2.
143. Id.
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Article 19. Interrelationships Between the Owner of a Trunk Pipeline
and Local State Agencies and Freight Shippers
Article 19's purpose is to protect the "trunk pipeline." Local state
agencies are not authorized to intervene in the operational activities of a
"trunk pipeline." 144 Employees and special equipment used for "trunk
pipeline" emergency situations cannot be diverted to other uses.145 The
underlying purpose of this Article is to protect "trunk pipelines", since they
will certainly be the lifeblood of the Kazakhstan economy for many years
to come. Article 19.2 appears to address equality of access to the "trunk
pipeline" by shippers. Unfortunately, it is not clear.
Article 20. Currency Transactions,
Article 20.2 should comfort investors a good deal. Article 20.2 states
that foreign contractors (this term is not defined) are entitled:
[I]ndependently to dispose of their hard-currency assets received as a result of
oil operations in the Republic of Kazakhstan, including transfer, storage, and
use of these assets outside the Republic of Kazakhstan, provided that tax obli-
gations are met and other payments under the contract are made; to make
settlements with agents and to pay wages in hard currency to resident and
nonresident workers involved in the conduct of oil,... to carry-out reexport
of hard currency.146
Article 20.1, however, undercuts Article 20.2. Article 20.1 states that
"[t]he procedure by which the contractor and subcontractor may conduct
currency transactions shall be defined by current law of the Republic of
Kazakhstan. ' '147 Is Article 20.1 necessary? By virtue of Article 16.1, con-
tractors are obligated to follow the "legal requirements of the Republic of
Kazakhstan." If Article 20.1 is not necessary, and it appears it is not, it
should be deleted. If Article 20.1 is deemed essential, it should be
expanded so that investors will know exactly what is contemplated. Obvi-
ously, this Article is extremely important to investors. Its wording should
be clear and unambiguous.
Article 20.2 allows contractors to "make settlements with agents and
to pay wages in hard currency to resident and nonresident workers
involved in the conduct of oil operations." 4 How expansively should this
provision be interpreted? Does this article address only personal wages?
Alternatively, can a company that is providing labor be paid in hard cur-
rency? Can a dirt moving company that is providing labor and equipment
by paid in hard currency? Note that pursuant to the Decree of the Presi-
dent of the Republic of Kazakhstan,1 49 any forms of "settlements and pay-
ments in foreign currency between legal entities, as well as between legal
144. Id. art. 19.1.
145. Id. art. 19.2.
146. Id. art. 20.2.
147. Id. art. 20.1.
148. Id art. 20.2.
149. Decree of President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, supra note 87.
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entities and citizens, except for labour pay" are prohibited.150 Obviously,
this is an important provision and it deserves clarification.
Article 21. Customs Procedures
Article 21.1 summarily addresses customs issues in one short sentence,
which says "[clustoms procedures shall be enforced in compliance with cur-
rent law of the Republic of Kazakhstan.' 15' As stated above in connection
with Article 15, the draft Oil Law would be improved if it contained a sen-
tence which stated that no import tariffs, taxes, duties, and/or levies of
whatever type shall be applied against equipment and machinery brought
into Kazakhstan for use in oil operations. Where oil and gas companies act
as contractors they do not, generally, pay customs duties, tariffs, or taxes.
As noted previously, under the Law of the Kazakh SSR on Foreign
Investments in the Kazakh SSR, adopted on December 7, 1990, "[t]he
property imported to the republic as investments of foreign investors and
not intended for sale shall not be liable to customs duties. Personal prop-
erty of foreign specialists employed at enterprises with foreign participa-
tion shall be brought into the republic duty-free.' 52 Does the reference in
Article 21.1 to "current law" refer to the Law of the Kazakh SSR on For-
eign Investments in the Kazakh SSR? And, are all imports and exports
relating to oil and gas operations exempt? Can the rules change with the
enactment of subsequent laws or does the reference to "current law" pro-
hibit the application of laws not in effect on the date of enactment of the
draft Oil Law?
Article 21 talks about "customs procedures' 53 and not customs duties,
tariffs, or related taxes. Should a distinction be drawn between procedures,
which are to be governed by "current law," and the imposition of customs
duties, tariffs, or taxes? Once again, clarification is necessary.
Article 22. Taxes and Payments
Article 22.1 provides that "[w]hen oil operations are conducted, the
contractor shall make the following payments, depending on the type,
terms, and conditions of the contract: a signing bonus... a land lease
payment... , a production bonus .... royalties."' 5 4 As if this is not
enough, Article 22.2 states that "the contractor also shall pay the following
taxes: a profit tax.., this rate shall be no lower than the profit tax rate on
enterprises as prescribed by tax law.... a tax on additional profits (this
term is not defined) .... other taxes prescribed by law. s15 5 The English
translation appears to say the contract will contain some, but not all, of the
150. lM.
151. Draft Oil Law, art. 21.1.
152. Law of the Kazakh SSR on Foreign Investments in the Kazakh SSR, adopted on December 7,
1990.
153. Draft Oil Law, art. 21.
154. Id. art. 22.1.
155. Id. art. 22.2.
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enumerated taxes and payments. It would be a terrible mistake to mandate
that every contract contain all the burdens enumerated in this article.
The fiscal and tax regime is understandably at the heart of whether
investments are made. Investors need to know exactly what taxes and pay-
ments will be imposed and the total amount of such levies. Investors will
take heart in Article 22.2, to the extent that it provides that the "profit tax
rate prescribed under the contract shall not be changed during the entire
effective term of the contract."' 5 6 Does this mean that the profit tax rate
will be set in the contract or only that the methodology, for determining
whether and to what extent profits have been made, will be set by the
contract?
Can the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet delegate to the competent body
the authority to set the profit tax? This issue needs to be clarified. Obvi-
ously, this is a very critical issue.
Article 22.3 is an extremely positive element of the draft Oil Law.
Article 22.3 states in its entirety that "[tihe contractor shall not be subject
to taxation by new types of taxes introduced after signing of the contract,
except in cases where such types of taxes are introduced in place of existing
ones that the contractor must pay under the contract."'1 57 This sentence
will give investors a certain level of comfort that no additional burdens will
be imposed. To the extent an investor is not absolutely certain that the tax
and fiscal regime is stable, the investor will necessarily build in additional
risk into its economics. As a result, the host government (here Kazakh-
stan) will receive a smaller portion of the total revenue stream or a smaller
economic rent.
While Article 22.2 prohibits the profit tax changes (up or down) and
Article 22.3 prohibits the introduction of new taxes, all is not stable and
secure. Article 22.2 also provides that the contractor is to "pay other taxes
prescribed by law."' 58 These unnamed taxes can be increased without
limit. I would strongly encourage the drafters to consider prohibiting
increases in these taxes, as has been done for profit taxes.
To the extent possible, the tax and fiscal regime related to production
of oil and gas should be put in place contemporaneously with the draft Oil
Law. The drafters of such tax and fiscal regime should have as their over-
riding premise the establishment of a system which clearly identifies all the
taxes and payments due, the exact amount of such burdens, and finally,
legislative enactments should provide that these taxes and payments cannot
be revised, unless mutually agreed to by Kazakhstan and the contractor.
Kazakhstan might consider following the example of countries like
Algeria. To assure the investing oil companies greater fiscal stability, con-
tractors in Algeria, who now enter into production-sharing agreements
with Sonatrach (the National Oil Company), 59 are protected against tax
156. I&
157. Id. art. 22.3.
158. I. art. 22.2.
159. See Ghiles, Francis, Arzew Plant Threatens Overcapacity, FIN, TIMES LIMrrED, Nov. 15, 1983,
at 18.
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increases. The contractor is given a portion of the production net of the
payment of all taxes and burdens on production. Sonatrach is responsible
for the payment of all taxes and burdens on production; however, the con-
tractor is only liable for its own corporate income/profit tax. This system
offers the contractor maximum comfort and protection from additional tax
burdens. Therefore, the investor's risk decreases. Concomitantly, the eco-
nomic rent for the Republic of Kazakhstan should increase.
Article 23. Accounting and Audit
Article 23 deals with accounting issues. In summary, international
accounting practices are allowed. The books and records can be kept in
freely convertible currencies, like the United States dollar, and government
audits shall not occur more often than once a year.16°
Article 24. Transfer of Rights and Obligations
Article 24 addresses assignments and transfers.161 Transfers of con-
tractual rights can be made (apparently both asset and stock transfers) with
the written consent of the competent body. The contract is to specify the
conditions relating to transfers.1 62 Article 24.2, somewhat cryptically, pro-
vides that "[e]xpenses related to the transfer of rights and obligations and
incurred in accordance with Item 1 of the present article shall be borne by
the contractor. 1 63 To avoid arbitrary and capricious actions, the first sen-
tence of Article 24.1 could be amended to read, in part, ". . . only with
written permission of a competent body, such permission shall not be
unreasonably withheld."
Article 24.2 is somewhat problematic. What is meant by the term
"expenses related to the transfer?" Is it anticipated that a transfer tax will
be imposed? The imposition of a transfer tax would be a mistake. This
would be especially problematic if the transfer tax was not explicitly estab-
lished. This should be clarified. Insignificant expenses relating to the filing
of corporate transfer documents are fine, but transfer taxes (especially
those that are not explicitly established) would chase away investment or
cause prospective investors to supplement their economic return to account
for the increased expense and risk. This is especially problematic where
the costs can not be quantified and analyzed. Fiscal uncertainty results in
an increased risk, which negatively affects the project economics. If a
transfer tax is considered necessary by Kazakhstan, it should be explicitly
provided. Companies will then know how to run their project's econom-
ics. Without such specificity, some companies will not seriously continue
with their evaluation and other companies will include a very large transfer
fee to be on the safe side which will, of course, negatively effect the eco-
160. Draft Oil Law, art. 23.
161. 1I art. 24.
162. 1I art. 24.1.
163. 1I art. 24.2.
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nomics from the perspective of Kazakhstan. (As the saying goes in the
United States, "there is no free lunch.")
Article 25. Insurance
The draft Oil Law contains a remarkably detailed insurance provision.
The specified insurance is to be provided by Kazakhstan insurance enter-
prises."6 This likely answers the question of why the insurance provision is
one of the longest articles in the draft Oil Law. In summary, contractors
are required to provide fire and explosion insurance on "property used
during oil operations", "fixed capital," "oil brought to the surface," and
"oil transported via a trunk pipeline.' 1 65 In addition, the, contractor must
obtain life and health insurance to protect its workforce and insurance for
"ecological disturbances.' 66 Contractors are permitted to conclude rein-
surance and coinsurance agreements with foreign insurance companies. 67
The contract may require additional insurance coverage. 68 Contracts not
supported by mandatory insurance are invalid. 69 Insurance is to "be pro-
vided in compliance with laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan and accepted
international practice and standards.' 170
Most large companies will want to self-insure. Self-insurance will
decrease the cost of the operation and, therefore, be of economic benefit to
both Kazakhstan and the contractor. Is self-insurance permitted under
Article 25? If not, the provision should be amended to permit self-
insurance.
Specific language of Article 25 provides that: (1) because of ownership
concerns, it is very difficult to insure linepack or oil moving in pipelines; (2)
workers' life and health insurance is dependent on social welfare legisla-
tion, which is still being developed; and (3) environmental insurance is pro-
hibitively expensive, if it is available at all.' 7 ' The insurance requirements
should be modified to take into consideration such concerns.
Article 26. Legal Interrelationships
This Article provides that "current law" shall govern the conditions of
employment for both foreign and Kazakhstan citizens.' 72 I do not antici-
pate problems with this provision. Having said this, the legislation should
not unnecessarily burden the operations by imposing rules that would
impede the efficiency of finding, producing, transporting, and marketing
oil and gas.
164. Id. art. 25.
165. Id
166. Id. art. 25.1.
167. Id.
168. Id. art. 25.2.
169. Id. art. 25.3.
170. Id. art. 25.5.
171. Id. art. 25.
172. Id. art. 26.
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Article 27. Alteration and Termination of the Contract
Article 27.1 provides that any changes to the contract shall be made in
writing.173 Article 27.2 provides that the contract shall terminate as pre-
scribed in the contract.1 74 These two articles are clear and not particularly
controversial. Article 27.3 talks about "early termination" and permits the
contractor to independently dispose of its property in such event.17 5 The
term "early termination" is undefined and it is not clear why this article
draws a distinction between "early termination" and contract expiration for
purposes of disposal of a contractor's property.
Finally, pursuant to Article 27.3 the competent body is give a "priority
right" to acquire a contractor's property in the event of "early termina-
tion." '176 The term "priority right". is likewise not defined and somewhat
ambiguous. Does this mean the competent body must not only pay the
same price offered by a third party, but must also abide by the same terms
and conditions offered by such third party? I assume the answer to this
question is yes.
These terms should either be defined to ensure no misunderstandings,
or Article 27.3 should be deleted. If deleted, the contract could address
these issues.
Article 28. Grounds for Recognition of Contracts and Licenses as
Invalid
Article 28 provides that the "Government of the Republic of Kazakh-
stan has the right to deem invalid and cancel a signed contract and/or an
issued license" 177 only in the following cases:
"[i]nformation that was submitted by the contractor concerning its financial
and technical capabilities and that was of great importance to the signing of
the contract and/or the issuance of a license does not comport with reality;
and [iut is determined by a court after a competition or auction that the
organizing committee ... had entered into a secret conspiracy with the con-
tractor-to-be concerning payment of illegal compensation to members of the
organizing committee ....
While I wholeheartedly agree with the thrust of this Article, I believe
what is important is not what the person reviewing an oil company's finan-
cial and technical capabilities thought was "of great importance," but
rather what a reasonable person in a similar position would have found
materially misleading. It is not totally clear from the language of Article
28.1 whether the standard is one of a reasonable person or one of the per-
son or persons who actually reviewed the financial and technical capabili-
ties of the contractor. This sentence should be revised and added to the
end of the provision so as to read, in part, "... in the competition or auc-
173. Id. art. 27.1.
174. Id art. 27.2.
175. Id art. 27.3.
176. Id
177. Id art. 28.
178. Id.
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tion; or information was submitted by the contractor concerning its finan-
cial and technical capabilities that a reasonable person reviewing such
information would have found to be materially misleading."
Finally, is the "license" referenced in Article 28.1 the same as the
"mining allotment" referenced in the Code on the Subsurface? Evidently,
from this reference, a contractor will sign a contract and will also need to
acquire some sort of license or mining allotment. The procedure for
acquiring such a license or mining allotment is not clear.
Article 29. Guarantees of the Rights of the Contractor
Article 29 states in its entirety, "[tihe Republic of Kazakhstan guaran-
tees the contractor protection of its rights in accordance with current
law."' 17 9 Obviously, a state guarantee of this nature is of significant impor-
tance to a prospective investor. What does the reference to "current law"
mean? What laws are applicable? Will an investor obtain the benefits of
prospective legislation, as well?
It is interesting to note, in this regard, that a fair number of Kazakh-
stan laws address the issue of state guarantees of investment and property.
The following laws (there may be more) contain state guarantees: the Law
of the Kazakh SSR on Foreign Investments in the Kazakh SSR i ° , the Law
of the Kazakh SSR on Free Enterprise and Development of Entrepreneur-
ship in the Kazakh SSR,"'8 the Law of the Kazakh SSR on Free Economic
Zones in the Kazakh SSR,'8 2 the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on
Tax System of the Republic of Kazakhstan, i"3 the Law of the Kazakh SSR
on Property in the Kazakh SSR'84 and the Law of the Kazakh SSR Enter-
prises in the Kazakh SSR.1as
The language of each of these laws is different with regard to state
guarantees. In accordance with its preamble, the draft Oil Law (and Arti-
cle 29) "acts in conjunction with other laws of the Republic of Kazakh-
stan."' 6 Does the preamble, in conjunction with the reference in Article
29 to "current law", mean that all the outstanding guarantees (that all dif-
fer from one another) need to somehow be harmonized to understand what
guarantees are mandated by law? How can this be done with language that
is implicitly or explicitly contradictory? The solution to this dilemma is
simple. The Oil Law should be a comprehensive law that is superior to and
supersedes laws in conflict with it.
179. Id art. 29.
180. LAW OF THE KAZAKH SSR ON FomON INVEsTMENs IN T ii KAZAKH SSR, adopted Dec. 7,
1990.
181. LAw OF THE KAZAKH SSR ON FREE ENTERPRISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF ENTREPRENEuRSHIP
IN Tm KAZAKN SSR, adopted Dec. 11, 1990.
182. LAW OF Tm KAzArW SSR ON FREE ECONOMIC ZONES IN THE KAZAKH SSR, adopted Dec.
15, 1990.
183. LAw OF THE REPuBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN ON TAX S'STEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KAZAKHSTAN, adopted Dec. 25, 1991.
184. LAW OF THE KAzAKI- SSR ON PROPERTY IN THE KAZAKH SSR, adopted Dec. 15, 1990.
185. LAW OF THE KAZAKIo SSR ENTERPRISES IN THE KAZAKH SSR, adopted Feb. 13, 1991.
186. Draft Oil Law, pmbl.
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While a detailed analysis of such a state guarantee is somewhat
beyond the scope of this analysis, the language of the guarantee could be
strengthened by mandating that prompt, adequate, and effective compen-
sation shall be made in the currency used by the investor. Compensation
should be based on the fair market value of the property (the discounted
cash flow method should be used) at the time of requisition and, should
such payment not be immediately forthcoming, interest shall apply at a
specified rate.
Article 30. Procedure for Review of Disputes
Article 30.1 adopts a somewhat customary approach to the resolution
of disputes. The parties are, in the first instance, to attempt to resolve their
disputes through negotiations."8 7 Should the negotiations not prove suc-
cessful, the "dispute shall be resolved by a court or the Arbitration Court
of the Republic of Kazakhstan, or, by agreement of the parties, by an arbi-
tration tribunal."'1 8
Prospective investors will demand the incorporation of an independ-
ent, international dispute resolution provision. The intent of Article 30.1
appears to satisfy this expectation, however, the language could be
strengthened by adding a couple of words to the end of the sentence, so
that the sentence would read, in part "... by an independent, international
arbitration tribunal."
An apparent conflict exists in Article 79 of the Code on the Subsurface
Resources. Article 79 directs that disputes be referred to and resolved by
"courts and arbitration courts.' 1 89 No mention is made of a mutually
agreed upon arbitration tribunal. But the conflict does not end here. The
following additional laws contain arbitration provisions which in part con-
flict with Article 30.1 of the draft Oil Law: the Law of the Kazakh SSR on
Foreign Investments in the Kazakh SSR, the Law of the Kazakh SSR on
Property in the Kazakh SSR and the Law of the Kazakh SSR on Free Eco-
nomic Zones in the Kazakh SSR. For the reasons discussed above in rela-
tion to Article 29 and Government guarantees, it is nearly impossible to
harmonize the laws as they relate to dispute resolutions. Most laws do not
allow for independent arbitration, yet some like the draft Oil Law do.
Once again, this situation cries out for a comprehensive oil and gas law that
is superior to and supersedes all conflicting laws.
As to the details of Article 30.1, I question the desirability of having
three arbitrators specified by law. I believe the decision whether one,
three, or perhaps more arbitrators should be used, should be left to the
contractor and to the competent body, and should be provided for in the
contract. The use of one arbitrator will result in a faster and cheaper dis-
pute resolution procedure.
187. Id. art. 30.1.
188. Id.
189. CODE ON THE SUBSURFACE, art. 79.
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X. ONE FINAL THOUGHT
The draft Oil Law does not explicitly address contracts that have been
executed prior to the effective date of the Law. Are these contracts to be
governed by the draft Oil Law? Consideration should be given (if not
already done so) to ensuring that previously executed contracts can be
readily governed by the draft Oil Law.
XI. SUMMARY
The draft Oil Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan lays the foundation
for a truly superior oil and gas law, that could significantly contribute to the
investment of substantial sums of capital in the oil and gas sector. The
draft Oil Law does, however, have some deficiencies. These deficiencies
can be overcome by making relatively minor modifications. When pro-
spective investing companies feel comfortable with both the language and
the implementation of the oil and gas legal regime, they will cease request-
ing the endorsement of both the full Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet and the
President for their contracts. Until then, prudent investors will want their
contracts to receive such endorsement in order to elevate their contract to
the level of a law of the republic, and, by so doing, alleviate a significant
portion of the business and legal risk.
The time is now for Kazakhstan. Oil companies throughout the world
are talking about and studying exploration and production opportunities
there. Unlike most host governments, Kazakhstan does not now have to
work particularly hard to attract interest. The interest is already there.
The question is whether Kazakhstan can capitalize on the moment and har-
ness the resources of the oil and gas industry to pull it into the 21st century.
The potential is enormous. The Kazakhstan work force is highly educated
and hardworking. The Government is committed to attracting foreign
investment. Finally, Kazakhstan's resource potential is huge. Kazakhstan
currently lacks a legal regime and business climate that is conducive to ful-
filling its aspirations and its potential. The expeditious development and
production of oil and gas could jump start the economy of Kazakhstan.
The oil and gas industry anxiously awaits the creation of a stable legal
regime and a healthy business climate.
No doubt some companies will brave uncharted and risky waters in the
search for world-class reserves and corresponding profits. Certainly, there
are such examples. Chevron, Elf Aquitaine, Birlesmis Muhendisler and
Burosu (BMB - a Turkish heavy engineering company), Oman Oil Com-
pany, and Anglo-Dutch Petroleum have all executed agreements. Chevron
and Elf Aquitaine have sizeable commitments and have secured certain
government endorsements of their agreements. Other companies, such as
British Gas and Agip, are negotiating on specific areas. Still other compa-
nies, especially those that are focused on exploration, will wait until the
legal regime solidifies before moving forward without the endorsement of
their contract by both the Supreme Soviet and the President.
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Enormous challenges face Kazakhstan. It has come a long way since
its independence in December 1991. The economic transformation has
started but has a long way to go. Delays in installing a pro-investment legal
regime will retard development. Worse yet, ineffective oil and gas legisla-
tion will do more than delay investment, it will chase it away. Because of
the enormous sums involved in the oil and gas sector and the associated
revenue streams, delays in executing contracts and initiating operations
could easily translate into multi-billion dollar losses for Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan has many challenges. Certainly, one near-term challenge
involves the creation of a stable, pro-investment legal regime and business
climate. In this regard, Kazakhstan has a way to go. The draft Oil Law can
be used as the basis for a comprehensive oil and gas law that will be one of
the cornerstones of real economic development in Kazakhstan.

